



PROCEDURAL PROTECTION ACCORDED APPLICANTS
BY STATE DEPARTMENT PASSPORT REGULATIONS
The plaintiff, an American citizen, was working in France when,
without a hearing, the Secretary of State revoked her passport, except for
return to this country. He explained simply that "her activities are con-
trary to the best interests of the United States." The plaintiff brought an
action to obtain a declaratory judgment and to enjoin the defendant's
revocation of her passport. This retraction without notice and fair hearing
was held to constitute a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952). The Secretary of
State then issued regulations providing that a passport applicant' be noti-
fied of a tenative or final denial. The reasons for the decision are to be
expressed as specifically as the State Department feels that security con-
siderations permit. In addition, applicants are accorded an informal hear-
ing, may be accompanied by counsel, and may offer all the evidence they
wish. If this hearing results in denial of a passport, the regulations provide
an appeal to a Board of Passport Appeals. 22 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 51.137-
51.139 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
Prior to Bauer v. Acheson, the issuance of passports was said to be
within the absolute discretion of the Secretary of State.2 The statute which
delegates this power to him is in permissive terms,8 and an executive order
authorizes refusal at the Secretary's discretion.4 At one time a passport
was not required for exit from the United States or for entrance into most
other countries, but was a letter of introduction to foreign governments
which entitled its bearer to American protection. 5 In the Bauer case, the
court held that freedom to travel abroad is a "liberty," and found that in-
ternational travel today without a passport is either impossible 6 or imprac-
1. Although these sections refer to "applicants," the regulations also apply to
cancelling, revoking or any other action ". . . affecting the ability of a person to use
a passport. . . ." 22 CoDE FED. REas. § 51.143 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
2. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349-50 (1939); Gillars v. United States,
182 F.2d 962, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Miller v. Sinjen, 289 Fed. 388, 394 (8th
Cir. 1923); 23 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 509 (1901); 13 Ops. Arr'y Gm. 89 (1869).
3. "The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports ... " 44 STAT.
887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. §211a (1946).
4. "The Secretary of State is authorized in his discretion to refuse to issue a
passport. . . ." 22 CODE FED. RGS. § 51.75 (Supp. 1949).
5. Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and
Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171-2 (1952).
6. In addition to Bauer v. Acheson see Comment, supra note 5. During World
War I citizens were denied the right to leave or enter the country without a pass-
port. 40 STAT. 559 (1918), 22 U.S.C. §§ 223-6 (1946); Presidential Proclamation
No. 1473 (1918). In 1941 this act was amended, enabling the President, during the
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tical. It thus declared by dictum that under the protection of the Due
Process Clause a passport may not be denied without a fair hearing.
7
If the regulations or case law provided for de novo judicial review,
the issue of procedural due process at the administrative level would be
unimportant. 8 But since the chances that such review might be obtained
by unsuccessful applicants are minimal, 9 some assurance of fair hearing
should be provided within the administrative process. Bauer v. Acheson
said that due process requires a procedure which accords an applicant the
elements of fair play, including the opportunity to be heard.' 0 The pass-
port regulations granting an applicant the right to appear, present his case,
and be accompanied by counsel," would seem to provide such a procedure.
In addition, the disappointed applicant is theoretically permitted adminis-
trative appeal, 12 but although more than a year has passed since the regula-
tions were promulgated, no board of appeals has been established and the
plaintiff in the Bauer case has not been granted a hearing in accordance
with the district court's mandate.13 Furthermore, although the provisions
for oral argument are adequate, they offer little consolation to applicants
in the absence of effective requirements for notice of charges and reasons
for decisions.' 4
The State Department procedural regulations for passport denial
necessitate only that the applicant be informed of the case against him as
specifically as the Department considers prudent.1 5 Thus, it would still seem
national emergency proclaimed in 1941, to prohibit citizens from leaving or entering
the country without passports until the President or Congress should provide
otherwise. 55 STAT. 252 (1941), 22 U.S.C. §§223-6 (1946). Such travel was pro-
hibited by Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 6 FED. REG. 5821 (1941).
The national emergency proclaimed in 1941 was ended in 1952. Presidential
Proclamation No. 2974, 17 FED. REG. 3813 (1952). However, the proclamation
prohibiting travel without a passport has not been abrogated. In addition, the
original statute has been replaced by a provision which is substantially the same
as the 1941 amendment except that it refers to "any" national emergency rather
than only the one proclaimed in 1941. 66 STAT. 190, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1185 (1952).
7. See instant case at 451-2.
8. It has often been held that if a party is entitled to a de novo review by a
court, the requirements of fair hearing are satisfied regardless of the type of adminis-
trative hearing provided. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Nickey
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934); Hager v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701
(1884).
9. The main issue here seems to be whether there is any right whatsoever to
judicial review of the administrator's discretion, not whether there is a right to
de novo review. See Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitu-
tional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171, 181-91 (1952).
10. 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952). The adjudication provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act are not applicable to this case since it involves the
conduct of "foreign affairs functions." 60 STAT. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1946).
11. 22 CODE FE. REGs. § 51.137 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
12. 22 id. §§ 51.138-9.
13. Correspondence to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review from the
American Civil Liberties Union and Jack Wasserman, Esquire, attorney for Miss
Bauer. On file in Biddle Law Library.
14. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1937); Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Takeo Tadano v. Manney,
160 F2d 665 (9th Cir. 1947) (cases collected).
15. 22 Code Fed. Regs. § 51.137 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
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possible to deny a passport with no more explanation than that the ap-
plicant's travel is deemed "contrary to the best interests of the United
States." In Bailey v. Richardson,'0 where a similar notice provision was
involved, the court said that the plaintiff was accorded a fair hearing even
though she was not informed of the specific charges upon which the
action against her was based. However, in that case it was held that gov-
ernment employment is a privilege involving neither life, liberty nor prop-
erty,1 7 whereas in Bauer v. Acheson the decision was based on the finding
that international travel is a "liberty." But the fact that the Due Process
Clause applies to passport issuance does not alone necessitate specificity
of charges, since the procedural requirements for fair hearings differ in
varying circumstances.18 Where security is involved, courts relax the req-
uisites of substantive and procedural protection,' 9 yet the individual must
still be accorded the greatest safeguards practicable.20 It must be noted
that "security," as used in this context, denotes concealment of the sources
of the government's information, and is related to national defense and
protection of national secrets only to the extent that such concealment
enables undercover agents to counter foreign espionage by infiltration into
Communist organizations. 2 The United States has contended in former
cases that it must deny applicants knowledge of the evidence against them
and of its source in order to avoid disclosure of its confidential agents.22
It has also asserted that citizen informants will be deterred from giving
information unless assured protection from the embarrassment of con-
frontation and cross-examination. 23 Conversely, both courts and com-
mentators have recognized that it is of the utmost importance to the in-
dividual to know precisely upon what information the case against him
16. 182 F.2d 46, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affirmed by equally divided court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
17. 182 F.2d at 57-8.
18. Where petitioner claimed that the granting of a license would interfere
with its operations, the court held that oral argument was not necessary to satisfy
due process, but recognized that it would be in other circumstances. FCC v. WJR,
The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
19. The summary relocation and detention during World War II of all persons
of Japanese ancestry was found to be Constitutional. Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). It has been held that although due process requires the
maximum safeguards feasible in light of security considerations, denial of certifi-
cation of dock workers as security risks without opportunity for confrontation and
cross-examination of informers is permissible. Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp.
433 (N.D. Cal. 1953). In time of war, persons employed on secret projects may
be ordered dismissed on suspicion of disloyalty without any hearing at all. Von
Knorr v. Miles, 60 F. Supp. 962 (D. Mass. 1945), modified on other grounds sub
nora. Von Knorr v. Griswold, 156 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1946).
20. ". . . where substantial rights are involved, the government must shoulder
the burden of affirmatively jutifying before the courts all deviations from accepted
procedure. In this context, then, I define due process in terms of the maximum
procedural safeguards which can be afforded petitioners without jeopardizing the
security program" Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
21. See Mr. Justice Douglas' definition of security in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 181 (1951) (concurring opinion).
22. See Elder v. United States, 202 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1953); Parker
v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1953); Hoover, A Comment on the
Article "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58 YALE: L.J. 401, 404, 417
(1949).
23. See note 22 supra.
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depends.2 Regardless of the strength of the evidence of informants,
without adequate notice the applicant is rendered virtually helpless to
refute it 25 and, lacking explicit reasons for decisions, the courts are
powerless to exercise intelligent control over the administrator's discre-
tion.26 Moreover, if the importance of notice to the individual and ade-
quate reasons for decisions are weighed against the importance of secrecy
to the security program, the government's claims are weakened by two
criticisms. First, it is feasible to inform a person of the basis of the case
against him without disclosing informants 27 Recognizing this fact, a fed-
eral court recently held that a Coast Guard Security Board must give in-
dividuals bills of particulars in proceedings against them.28 Second, in
most cases, if the government fears that disclosure of an informer's ac-
cusations will reveal his identity, it is possible to use those accusations to
obtain further evidence as the basis for an independent case which will
bear scrutiny.
2 9
The problem of whether secrecy of charges and reasons for decisions
are so necessary to security as to compel less stringent notice requirements
has not yet been settled in the higher courts. When it is, they should
require positive proof that complete secrecy is necessary to maintain the
efficacy of our counter-espionage program before denying the individual
a hearing with the degree of notice formerly thought requisite. If secrecy
is not essential, it would seem that the passport regulations which permit
vague charges fall short of the procedural safeguards declared necessary
in Bauer v. Acheson.8"
24. Takeo Tadano v. Manney, 160 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1947) (cases collected);
see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-2 (1950)
(concurring opinion).
One commentator on administrative law has stated: "It is vain to give a man
his day in court if he has no effective opportunity to prepare for it. To commence
a trial without first giving reasonable precise information concerning the matter
that is to be heard is to mock the 'due process of law' which tradition and constitu-
tion alike demand in this country." GELLHoRN, SECuRiTY, LoYALrv, & ScIENCE
204 (1950).
25. Id. at 209-10; Obrian, Loyalty Tests & Guilt by Association, 61 HAv. L.
REv. 592, 606 (1948).
26. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292
(1937) ; see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-2
(1950) (concurring opinion); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (dissenting opinion). The court will review the exercise of
the Secretary of State's discretion. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C.
1952).
27. Donovan and Jones, Program For a Democratic Counter Attack to Com-
munist Penetration of Government Service, 58 YALE, L.J. 1211, 1235 (1949).
28. Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
29. Brown and Fassett, Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Process
Under the Port Security Program, 62 YALE L.J. 1163, 1201 (1953); Donovan and
Jones, supra note 27.
30. To be contrasted with the Bauer situation is the case of William Clark,
the deposed Chief Justice of United States courts in West Germany. Following his
suspension from that position by the State Department, Justice Clark's passport
was picked up by a Consul General and he received one valid only for travel directly
to the United States. Because he contends that the passport was taken from him
under duress, Clark is presently seeking a writ of mandamus against the State




HOLDER'S DESTRUCTION OF BONDS BELIEVED
VALUELESS HELD INTENTIONAL CANCELLATION
The owner of sixteen bonds, issued in 1912 by defendant corporation
and in default of both principal and interest for about six years, destroyed
them in 1939 upon being advised by her financial agent that they were
worthless. After the corporation went through bankruptcy reorganization
proceedings in 1949, each bond was exchangeable upon surrender for $400
in cash and $600 in preferred stock. The owner informed the defendant
corporation of the destruction and applied for the offered exchange value,
tendering an indemnity bond to protect against wrongful payment. The
defendant corporation refused to honor the claim although it had received
no previous notice of the destruction and had carried the bonds as out-
standing obligations on its books during reorganization. In a suit to
recover the recognized value of the bonds the circuit court affirmed the
district court's finding that the plaintiff had not overcome the presumption
that an intentional destruction of the instruments manifested an intent to
discharge the debt. The destruction was thus an intentional cancellation
which was not made inoperative by a mistake I and which discharged the
corporation's obligation under the NIL.2 State Street Trust Co. v.
Muskogee Electric Traction Co., 204 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1953).
Under the NIL the holder of a negotiable instrument may waive his
rights, by renunciation 3 or intentional cancellation,4 against any 5 or all
1. Under the NIL § 123, a cancellation made under a mistake is inoperative.
See note 2 infra. The court in the instant case rejected the plaintiff's contention
that a destruction of bonds under the belief that they were worthless was a mistake
within the meaning of the statute, on the ground that the facts on which plaintiff
based her decision appeared to be true at the time of cancellation. Instant case
at 922-3. Accord, Broad & Market Nat. Bank of Newark v. New York & Eastern
Realty Co., 102 N.Y. Misc. 82, 168 N.Y. Supp. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (cancellation
of note by bank on receipt of depositor's check discharged the obligation, although
depositor's account was insufficient to cover the check because a check previously
credited to it was uncollectible).
2. "A negotiable instrument is discharged:
"3. By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder." OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 48, § 261 (1950) ; NIL § 119.
"A cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mistake . . . is inopera-
tive; but where an instrument . . . appears to have been cancelled the burden
of proof lies on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made uninten-
tionally or under a mistake .. " OimA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 265 (1950);
NIL § 123.
These statutory provisions have been enacted without variation in all forty-
eight states. See BRANNAN, NEGorIABIE INSTRUMENTS LAW 173-7 (7th ed., Beutel,
1948).
3. NIL § 122.
4. See note 2 supra.
5. "A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged:
"2. By the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder." NIL
§ 120.
19541
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parties to the instrument without receiving consideration in return for the
waiver. These provisions, derived from the English Bills of Exchange
Act,6 were originally a part of French law and were adopted by England
to bring the common law into conformity with the civil Law Merchant.
7
However, the nature of the intent required to discharge an instrument by
cancellation is not defined in the English or American statutes nor in the
treatises of the draftsmen.8 Most text writers interpret the statutory word
"cancellation" to mean no more than some physical act of mutilation or
destruction of the instrument,9 so that an intentional cancellation requires
only a voluntary performance of the act. This interpretation seems to have
been furthered by the similarity of some negotiable instruments in form and
function to currency,10 by the fear that intentionally destroyed instruments
would become the basis for fraudulent claims, and by the common law
symbolism which equated rights with things. Many courts have there-
fore ruled that the cause of action is embodied in the evidence of indebted-
ness and is lost when this evidence is intentionally -destroyed." Other
courts, however, attempting to make the discharge of the obligation meet
the common law requirements of a gift,'2 have required that for a destruc-
tion to act as a discharge the holder must intend to confer a gratuity on the
6. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vicr., c. 61, §§ 62, 63.
7. Legis., 4 TULANE L. REV. 117, 119 (1929) (discussing §§ 119, 122).
8. Section 63 of the Bills of Exchange Act, supra note 6, merely states that a
bill is discharged where it is "intentionally cancelled." Judge Chalmers' digest, con-
sidered the basic source of the Act, states that if the holder of a bill strikes out the
acceptor's signature, intending to cancel it, the acceptance is waived and the bill
discharged. CHALMERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NOTES AND CHEQUES 190 (1st ed. 1878). See note 15 infra for Chalmers' authority.
For the applicable sections of the NIL, see notes 2 and 5 supra. The Com-
missioners' Notes do no more than direct the reader to the analogous provisions
in the Bills of Exchange Act. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 173-7
(7th ed., Beutel, 1948). CRAWFORD, NETIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 83, 87 (1st ed.
1897), merely repeats the statute. See Hickox v. Hickox, 151 S.W.2d 913, 917-8
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
Neither the Uniform Commercial Code nor the comment thereon purport to
define intentional cancellation, but merely state the methods by which it may be
accomplished. UCC § 3-605 (Official Draft 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-605
(Purdon Supp. 1953). But see UCC 3-804, which provides a method of recovery
on instruments which are lost, destroyed or stolen.
9. "As intentional destruction of the instrument by the holder is a complete
discharge by the unwritten law-and as the physical act of destruction is but can-
cellation carried to its utmost limit-the greater act of destruction necessarily
includes the lesser act of cancellation. . . ." BIGELOW, BIuS, NOTEs, AND CHECKS
467 (3d ed. 1928); see, e.g., BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTEs § 272 (1943); WIU.ISTON,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 172-3 (1947). But see CORBIN, CONTRAcTS § 1250 n.38
(one volume ed. 1952).
10. See BRTON, BILLS AND NOTES §272 (1943).
11. Norton v. Smith, 130 Me. 58, 153 Atl. 886 (1931); McDonald v. Loomis,
233 Mich. 174, 206 N.W. 348 (1925); Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14 N.J.L. 178 (Sup.
Ct. 1833); Blade v. Noland, 12 Wend. 173 (N.Y. 1834). Other courts dealing
with this problem have not interpreted intent to cancel. E.g., In re Lock's Will,
187 N.Y. Misc. 535, 64 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Surr. Ct. 1946); Jones' Adm'rs v. Coleman,
121 Va. 86, 92 S.E. 910 (1917).
12. The destruction by the donor of the evidence of indebtedness with the in-
tention to make a gift to the debtor is sufficient forgiveness of the debt. BROWN,
PERSONAL PROPERTY §62 (1936).
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debtor.' 3 A third line of authority,14 based to some extent on the origin
of the cancellation provision in English law,15 has stated an intermediate
position: the intent necessary to discharge an instrument by cancellation
is the intent to wipe out or nullify the obligation.
The instant court rejected the plaintiff's contention that a gratuitous
intent was necessary for a discharge by physical destruction.' 6 This
rejection appears to be justified, for if the creditor were required to prove
in each case that the debtor had destroyed the instrument with a gift in
mind, fraudulent claims would be encouraged. 17 Moreover, that policy
of the NIL which permits discharge without consideration in order to
expedite the settlement of commercial transactions 18 would be thwarted.
In setting forth the requirements for "intentional cancellation," however,
the instant court was far from precise. It apparently adopted the rule
that a mere voluntary destruction of the instrument constitutes an inten-
13. Wilkins v. Skoglund, 127 Neb. 589, 256 N.W. 31 (1934); Henson v. Henson,
151 Tenn. 137, 268 S.W. 378 (1924).
14. Boulter v. Joliet Nat. Bank, 295 Ill. 594, 129 N.E. 513 (1920) (whether
cancellation of original note and renewal agreement with one co-maker acted as
a discharge of second co-maker was a question of fact depending on the intention
of the parties); Greene v. Poz, 182 N.Y. Supp. 900 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (whether
notes torn in argument between business partners were intentionally cancelled was
a fact issue for the jury; the court stated at 902: "It may be argued . . . that
the circumstances of mutilation are more indicative of a mere outburst of temper
than of a real intent to give up the right to collect the moneys represented by the
notes. . . .") ; cf. Texas Nat. Bank of Beaumont v. Debes, 132 Tex. 207, 120
S.W.2d 794 (1938) (although old instrument was discharged by intentional destruc-
tion, renewal shows there was no intention to extinguish the original indebtedness).
15. Judge Chalmers cites two cases for his formulation of what has become
the intentional cancellation provision of the NIL (see note 8 supra), not as square
holdings for his proposition, but as parallel propositions to it. They are: Yglesias
v. Mercantile Bank of the River Plate, 3 C.P.D. 60, 66 (1877) (cancellation of bills
pursuant to an agreement by the acceptor and payee did not discharge the check
given as security by the drawer, a third party, since the payee did not intend it
as such); Sweeting v. Halse, 9 B. & C. 365, 109 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B. 1829)
(whether cancellation by maker's son pursuant to a renewal, which failed
for lack of a stamp, was assented to by holder was a jury question).
16. The court also stated, citing Wilkins v. Skoglund, 127 Neb. 589, 256 N.W.
31 (1934), that an intentional cancellation did not have to meet the requirements
of an unconditional renunciation; but the Wilkins case only decided that an inten-
tional cancellation did not have to be in writing, not what intent was necessary to
cancel. See Comment, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 165 (1934).
In addition, the court argued that to require a gratuitous intent would greatly
weaken the explicit words of the statute, even though there is no attempt in the
statute to define "intentional cancellation." See text following note 7 supra.
17. The court quoted McDonald v. Loomis, 233 Mich. 174, 206 N.W. 348 (1925),
to the effect that only the intent to destroy the evidence of the debt is relevant. The
authority of McDonald was Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14 N.J.L. 178 (Sup. Ct. 1833),
which was grounded on the avoidance of fraudulent claims.
18. See Shaffer v. Akron Products Co., 91 Ohio App. 535, 109 N.E.2d 24
(1952), 22 U. OF CIm. L. Rav. 412 (1953) (stockholder released defendant corpora-
tion from obligation on note to improve financial condition of corporation) ; Schole-
field v. Templer, 4 De G. & J. 429, 45 Eng. Rep. 166 (Ch. 1859) (payee, having
received further security from the maker, released surety to enable the latter to
receive sufficent credit to enter new business) ; Whatly v. Tricker, 1 Campbell 35
(1807) (payee of three-party bill of exchange, expecting to receive payment in
goods from the drawer, released acceptor and thus enabled latter to make assign-
ment for the benefit of other creditors).
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tional cancellation 19 and concluded its analysis of the intention issue with
the statement that the statute was complied with because the plaintiff
"actually intended to burn these particular bonds." 20 Although this
rejection of any subjective intent best prevents fraud and is most com-
mercially expedient, it appears too inflexible to deal justly with the various
commercial transactions in which parties clearly do not wish the obliga-
tions discharged 2 ' or with odd factual situations which fall outside the
ordinary commercial pattern. 22  The court's extended discussion of the
problem, however, was unnecessary if voluntary destruction was equivalent
to discharge; furthermore, other language in the court's opinion 23 indicates
that the debtor must intend to wipe out or nullify the obligation. Such a
test would seem to provide the desired flexibility without unduly hamper-
ing the statutory policies of commercial expediency and the prevention of
fraud. When applied to this case a contrary result would appear to be
required, for the burning of the bonds manifested a loss of hope, not a
waiver of the right to recover if the debtor should ever regain solvency.
On a policy basis, the enrichment of the corporation and the hardship to
the plaintiff appear unnecessary since the corporation could not have relied
on a destruction of which it was unaware, and the corporate records might
have prevented a fraudulent or mistaken payment; 24 in addition, the cor-
poration would have been protected against any possible loss by the in-
demnity bond proffered by the plaintiff. In rejecting this result without
clearly defining the basis of the rejection, the court has at least indicated
that the burden of proving that a particular voluntary destruction was not
an intentional cancellation is extremely high.
The instant court, implying that the plaintiff had chosen the wrong
action,25 adverted, inter alia,26 to the broader equitable powers of a court
19. E.g., the court states at 922: "'The purpose or intent of the holder beyond
intent to destroy his evidence of indebtedness is immaterial' . . . McDonald v.
Loomis ... "
20. Instant case at 922.
21. Cases involving renewals are: Boulter v. Joliet Nat. Bank, 295 Ill. 594,
129 N.E. 513 (1920); Texas Nat. Bank of Beaumont v. Debes, 132 Tex. 207, 120
S.W.2d 794 (1938); Sweeting v. -alse, 9 B. & C. 365, 109 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B.
1829). See also cases cited at note 18 mtpra; Yglesias v. Mercantile Bank of the
River Plate, 3 C.P.D. 60 (1877), described at note 15 supra.
22. Notes torn during arguments between maker and holder: Greene v. Poz,
182 N.Y. Supp. 900 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14 N.J.L. 178 (Sup.
Ct. 1833). The factual situation of the instant case is another example of this
type.
23. The court uses the phrases "wipe out or nullify," "forgive" and "forget."
It also adopts the presumption that an intention to cancel the indebtedness arises
from an intentional cancellation of the instruments. This presumption would be
unnecessary if intent to cancel the indebtedness were irrelevant.
24. The value of the corporation's records for this purpose depends on whether
the instant bonds were registered or bearer. This fact cannot be ascertained from
the court's opinion.
25. Another possible solution is the application to bonds of § 17 of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, which requires a corporation to replace a lost or destroyed
stock certificate upon the posting of an indemnity bond by the claimant. See
CHRsTry, THE TRANsFER OF STocK § 296 (2d ed. 1940). The transfer of negotiable
bonds, however, has been previously governed by the NIL. This analogy of bonds
to stocks is unnecessary under the Uniform Commercial Code, where the instant
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in an action for money had and received.27 If this court were to give plain-
tiff relief in such an action on the underlying debt after having denied him
relief in a suit on the bond, it would be sacrificing the objectives of the NIL
to the formality of preserving different forms of action. On the other hand,
the maintenance of a rigid rule in an action on the instrument might better
prevent fraud, while the equitable nature of the restitution action could
reward a deserving plaintiff. The operation of these equitable powers in
an action at law may be barred, however, by a statute of limitations
28
Criminal Law-
INDICTMENT OF COUNTY PROSECUTOR FOR
NONFEASANCE HELD SUFFICIENT WITHOUT
ALLEGATION OF CORRUPT OR EVIL INTENT
The Prosecutor of Bergen County, New Jersey, was indicted for non-
feasance in office for failing to investigate, prosecute or otherwise pro-
ceed against operators of gambling houses and corrupt police officials whose
activities had been reported to him. The lower court held the indictment
insufficient for its failure to allege a corrupt or evil motive.' On certifica-
tion, the supreme court reversed, holding that an allegation of willfulness
was sufficient and that corruption need not be alleged. State v. Winne,
12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953).
The offense of which the defendant is accused is the common law
crime of misconduct in office, which includes misfeasance and nonfeasance.
2
A corrupt intent is considered to be a necessary element of the crime
bonds would appear to be Investment Securities under Article 8. See UCC § 8-102
(Official Draft 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-102 (Purdon Supp. 1953) (de-
fining the term "security"). This Article, at § 8-405, adopts the "corporate replace-
ment of lost or destroyed instruments" rule, but does not contain the intentional can-
cellation provision of the NIL. Instruments included in the Commercial Paper
section of the Code are governed by both the corporate replacement rule, § 3-804,
and the intentional cancellation provision, § 3-605.
26. The court, at 923, also mentioned the equitable powers of a bankruptcy
court. There does not appear to be enough information in the court's opinion for
a critical appraisal of this suggestion.
27. See Ryan v. Spaniol, 193 F.2d 551, 553 and cases cited n.6 (10th Cir.
1951) (equitable principles operate in an action for money had and received to
prevent unjust enrichment) ; ef. Gardner v. Rutherford, 57 Cal. App. 2d 874, 136 P.2d
48 (1943) (action on book account was valid, despite holder's intentional destruc-
tion of note given on the transaction, because parties had agreed to carry note
on books without renewal).
28. See 6 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS §2032 and n.5 (Rev. ed. 1938). Moreover,
in the instant case, the statute of limitations would not be waived by the corpora-
tion's new promise to pay its bonded debt because this promise was conditional upon
the surrender of the instruments. See 1 CopniN, CONTRAcTs §215 (8 volume ed.
1951).
1. State v. Winne, 21 N.J. Super. 180, 91 A.2d 65 (1952).
2. See State v. Barnett, 60 Okla. Cr. 355, 376, 377, 69 P.2d 77, 86 (1936).
1 Buwicx, LAw op' CRIME § 272 (1946); MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 162 (1934).
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in the case of discretionary officers,3 but it is not required where an officer's
duties are ministerial. The distinction is made to avoid hampering officers
in the exercise of their discretionary duties through the fear of prosecution
for errors of judgment.4 The requirement of a corrupt intent affords pro-
tection in this respect, for acts done with corrupt intent frequently involve
wrongful self-gain 5 and imply moral turpitude and intentional wrong.,
Accordingly, statutes requiring only willful refusal or neglect for convic-
tion have been held to apply only to nondiscretionary functions. 7 The usual
action against prosecutors seems to be a proceeding for removal rather
than a criminal prosecution.8 Where the latter course has been selected,
prosecutions of these officers have been based on acceptance of bribes 9
and abetting of law violations.10
Nevertheless, the court in the instant case denied the necessity of
alleging a corrupt or evil intent, citing State v. Jefferson '1 which indicated
that corruption, there implicitly alleged, was surplusage.12  While the
duties of the prosecutor as prescribed by law were said to be mandatory,
the instant court recognized that the proper conduct of the prosecutor's
office requires the exercise of discretion 1s and apparently based its deci-
sion primarily on an enlarged definition of the word "willful" rather than
3. See State v. Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 47-8, 63 A.2d 644, 646 (1949) (willful and
corrupt); Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Super. 107, 120, 14 A.2d 907, 913
(1940) (willful and corrupt); Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 244, 248, 8
A.2d 618, 621 (1939) (evil and corrupt). See also 1 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW §460
(9th ed. 1923); 1 BuwicK, op. cit. supra note 2, §,272(a) (omission not in itself
indictable); MILLER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 162(a) (improper motive).
4. A similar rationale is advanced for the rule that discretionary officers are to
be immune from civil liability for their official acts. See, e.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12
F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curian, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), and authorities col-
lected therein.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1941); La Tour v.
Stone, 139 Fla. 681, 190 So. 704 (1939) ; State v. Barnett, supra note 2.
6. See State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13 N.J. Super. 172, 204, 80 A.2d 342,
358 (1951) ; State v. Barnett, supra note 2, at 374, 69 P.2d at 86.
7. State v. Brattrud, 210 Minn. 214. 297 N.W. 713 (1941). For an analysis of
state statutes and the involved interpretations of them, see 4 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 264
(1951) and 20 N.C.L. REv. 110 (1941). A New Jersey statute of this type was not
mentioned by the court in deciding the instant case. "Any magistrate or other public
official who shall willfully refuse or neglect to perform, within the time required by
law, any duty imposed upon him by law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." N.J.
STAT. ANN. tit. 2, c. 160, § 1 (1937). Title 2 of the New Jersey statutes was repealed
effective January 1, 1952, subsequent to the alleged nonfeasance. The appropriate
statute now reads, "A public officer who willfully refuses or neglects to perform any
duty imposed upon him by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor." N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A,
§ 135-1 (1953).
8. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937) ; Attorney General
v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921); State v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 182
S.W.2d 313 (1944) ; State v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91 (1940); State v.
Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939).
9. State v. Jefferson, 88 N.J.L. 447, 97 Atl. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1916), aff'd, 90 N.J.L.
507, 101 Atl. 569 (1917) ; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 112 Ky. 482, 66 S.W. 29 (1902).
10. Speer v. State, 130 Ark. 457, 198 S.W. 113 (1917).
11. 88 N.J.L. 447, 97 AtI. 162 (Sup. Ct 1916), aff'd, 90 N.J.L. 507, 101 Atl.
569 (1917).
12. Id. at 449, 97 Atl. at 163.
13. Instant case at 168, 96 A.2d at 71.
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on a determination that the prosecutor's is a ministerial office.14 Instead
of limiting the term to intentional or deliberate, the court said that "will-
ful" appearing in the indictment indicated a lack of good faith and an
absence of just cause or excuse, equivalent to bad faith,15 and that these
qualities sufficiently constituted the mental element of the crime. Since
an indictment must contain all the elements of the crime which the state
is required to prove,1 the court's new definition is apparently intended to
preclude convictions for mere negligent refusals to proceed, or intentional
refusals founded on honest judgment.' 7  However, a Pennsylvania deci-
sion,18 involving the alleged nonfeasance of a superintendent of police,
expressly denied that "willful" implied an evil intent or corrupt motive. 19
The indictment, alleging willfulness but not a corrupt motive or intent, was
held insufficient, but the reason for the holding was that only an exercise
of discretion in bad faith could be indictable. 20 Thus the intent requirement
of the two cases is the same; the difference is only semantic. Furthermore,
in many cases where corruption has been alleged there has been no require-
ment that the acts include wrongful self-gain, and some cases seem to
have demanded little more than acts committed with a lack of good faith.21
If the definition of the word "willful" is limited as in the instant case, there
will be no variance from prior law as to the proof required for the convic-
tion of discretionary officers.
The powers which are exclusively the prosecutor's are a convincing
indication that a wide latitude of independent judgment must be afforded
him in the exercise of his duties. At common law the prosecuting attorney
had an absolute discretion in entering a nolle prosequi.22 This decision
to cease prosecution lay entirely with him, and the court was bound by
his decision. Although many state statutes have made the judgment of
14. Only when appearing in criminal statutes has "willfully" been construed
to include improper motive within its' meaning. See Roberts v. United States,
126 Fed. 894, 904 (5th Cir. 1903); Commonwealth v. Hubbs, supra note 3 at 250,
8 A.2d at 621. But see 1 Bisuop, op. cit. supra note 3, § 428.
15. Instant case at 175, 96 A.2d at 74. Each count of the indictment was in the
same form: ". . unlawfully and willfully did neglect and omit to perform the said
public duties enjoined upon him. . .
16. State v. Lustig, 13 N.J. Super. 149, 80 A.2d 309 (1951) ; 1 WHAARTON, Cim-
INAL PROCEDURE § 194 (10th ed., Kerr, 1918).
17. But the court at another point in its opinion indicates that mere negligent
failures to proceed might be indictable by saying, "If the law were as defendant
contends [that corruption must be alleged and proved] an honest, but negligent pros-
ecutor would have it within his power to nullify the enforcement of the criminal
law. . . ." Instant case at 170-1, 96 A.2d at 72.
18. Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 244, 8 A.2d 618 (1939).
19. Id. at 250, 8 A.2d at 621.
20. Ibid.
21. Speer v. State, 130 Ark. 457, 198 S.W. 113 (1917) (abetting of crime);
State v. Sweeten, 83 N.J.L. 364, 85 Atl. 309 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (acts intended to oppress,
hurt, injure or aggrieve another); The King v. Brooke, 2 T.R. 190 (1788) (acts done
in passion or oppression); Rex v. Williams, 3 Burr. 1317 (1762) (intimidation);
cf. Broadbent v. United States, 149 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir. 1945) (any endeavor to
influence a witness or to impede and obstruct justice).
22. United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D. Mont 1924); State v. Finch, 128
Kans. 665, 280 Pac. 910 (1929) ; see United 'States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 102
(S.D. Ill. 1945); cf. United States v. Krakowitz, 52 F. Supp. 774, 775 (S.D. Ohio
1943); Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106, 108 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
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the prosecutor in this regard subject to approval of the court,2 the entry
of nolle prosequi is still the act of the prosecuting attorney and cannot
be made by the court alone.24 Similarly, the decision to initiate prosecu-
tion has been held to be exclusively the prosecuting attorney's. He is to
decide when, how and against whom to proceed; and the determination is
to be made independently and free from the judgment of others.25 It would
appear that the statutory duty to investigate and detect must also be dis-
cretionary, for should the instant decision be construed *as holding the
prosecutor's duty of investigation a ministerial function,26 it would deprive
prosecutors of the exercise of free judgment and impose upon them the
burden of investigating each report of criminal activity. A prosecutor often
selects the course of inaction. He may decide not to investigate2 7 or
prosecute because of changed circumstances, because more complete testi-
mony will become available later, or because essential testimony can be had
only through a grant of immunity.28 All such decisions would be deliberate
or intentional, but they would not be "willful" as the word is construed
in this case. Nevertheless, the decision here appears to set a precedent
which certainly must be discomforting to discretionary officers, particularly
those in New Jersey, who may well fear the application to themselves by
incautious courts of the redefined word with the old meaning. This danger
is increased by the court's failure to deal with the New Jersey misconduct
statute which is applied to ministerial officers and which requires "willful-
ness" only in the limited sense.2 9 The meaning of the word will now differ
according to the office to which it is applied, a process which occurs often
enough without being encouraged.
23. Commonwealth v. Huddleston, 283 Ky. 465, 141 S.W.2d 867 (1940). See
Price v. Cobb, 60 Ga. App. 59, 61, 3 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1939) ; Commonwealth v. Ashe,
138 Pa. Super. 222, 227, 11 A.2d 173, 175 (1940); Wallace v. State, 145 Tex. Cr.
625, 629, 170 S.W.2d 762, 764 (1943).
24. McGrane for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 47 R.I. 106, 130 Atl. 804 (1925) (power
of nolle prosequi exclusively attorney general's and assistants').
25. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920); United States v. Brokaw,
supra note 22, at 101, 103; People v. Pollock, 25 Cal. App. 440, 77 P.2d 885 (1938).
See District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
26. One dissenting judge was of the opinion that the majority had impliedly held
the duty of detection ministerial. Instant case at 189, 96 A.2d at 83.
27. ". . he shall use all reasonable and lawful diligence for the detection,
arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the laws." N.J. STAT. ANN. tit.
2, c. 182, § 5 (1939). For a survey and discussion of various statutes prescribing the
prosecutor's duties and an indication that investigation or detection should not be
included, see Baker and DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney, 24 J. CanR. L. & CaIM-
INOLOGY 1025 (1934).
28. See Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 770 (1933) ; Miller, The Conpromise of Criminal Cases, 1 So. CAL. L.
Rxv. 1 (1927) ; Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 64 (1948); Snyder, The District Attorney's Hardest
Task, 30 J. Cams. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167 (1939).
29. See note 7 supra. The statute has apparently not been applied in any case
involving discretionary officers. This may be explained by the fact that it has been
said to be merely declaratory of the common law. State v. Tulenko, 133 N.J.L. 385,
387, 44 A.2d 350, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1945). For that reason also, the statute is seldom
referred to in prosecutions of ministerial officers, although at least two such cases were
said to be based on the statute. These concerned prosecutions against election officials
for failure to reject illegal ballots and a police recorder who released a prisoner with-
out authority. See State v. Monia, 132 N.J.L. 91, 38 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1944); State
v. Shahadi, 137 N.J.L. 623, 61 A.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
RECENT CASES
Decedent's Estates-
DECEASED'S LIQUOR LICENSE TRANSFERRED
TO WIDOW FREE OF CLAIM BY ESTATE
Decedent held a retail liquor license under which he operated a tavern
on leased premises. His widow was appointed administratrix and secured
the transfer of the license to herself pursuant to a statute which authorized
the liquor control board to pass a decedent's license to his surviving spouse
or personal representative.' She operated the tavern for several months
and later sold the business for $11,820, of which $11,020 represented the
value of the license. In her final administratrix's account, she failed to
include the latter amount as an asset of the estate. The auditing judge
surcharged the widow with this sum,2 but the appellate court, three judges
dissenting, reversed, holding that the liquor license was not property but
a privilege which terminated with the licensee's death. Because the license
was not an asset of the estate, the widow was free to secure the transfer
of a new license for her own use under the statute. Ryan Estate, 375 Pa.
42, 99 A.2d 562 (1953).
The sale of intoxicants, although uncontrolled at common law,3 is now
completely governed by statutes which either prohibit sales entirely 4 or
permit them only under state license.5  While some states do not allow
the transfer of these licenses, 6 others, such as Pennsylvania, permit it
subject to the approval of the liquor control board.7  The Pennsylvania
act further provides that "[i] n the case of the death of a licensee, the board
may transfer the license to the surviving spouse or personal representative
or to a person designated by him." 8 Because of the value of this right
of transfer,9 dispute has arisen over the particular property attributes of
a liquor license. Cases involving license revocation generally hold that
1. "In the case of the death of a licensee, the board may transfer the license to
the surviving spouse or personal representative or to a person designated by him."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4-468(a) (Purdon 1952). For similar statutes in other
jurisdictions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 571 (1953); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 311.250
(Vernon 1952); VT. REV. STAT. § 6172 (1947).
2. Ryan Estate, 81 Pa. D. & C. 18 (1952).
3. See State v. Roberts, 74 N.H. 476, 477, 69 AtI. 722, 723 (1908).
4. MISS. CODE ANN. § 2613 (1942) ; OYrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 1 (1953). These
are the only states that adhere to total prohibition. Some jurisdictions operate under
local option provisions. See HARIusoN AND LAINE, AFTER REPEAL 70-3 (2d ed. 1936).
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 43, §§ 115-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1953); OHIO GEN. CODE
ANN. §§6064-15, 6064-15b (Page Supp. 1952); ORE. CoMP. LAws ANN. §24-116
(1940).
6. N.Y. ALCOHOLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 114. For tabulated data on license
transfer see THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE STATES TO STUDY ALCOHOLIc BEVERAGE
LAWS, ALcOHOLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL 112-6 (1950).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.32 (Supp. 1952); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.988 (Supp.
1951) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 4-468 (Purdon 1952).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-468 (Purdon 1952).
9. See text at and after note 16 infra. For example, of the total sales price of
$11,820 in the instant case, $11,020 represented the value of the license.
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liquor permits are not property but a personal privilege,'0 for this insures
complete control over licensing by the state by allowing revocation without
the interposition of deprivation of property claims by licensees." For some
purposes, however, such as bankruptcy proceedings 12 or levy under execu-
tion,13 licenses have been held to constitute property; 14 and in Pennsyl-
vania, several cases involving decedent's estates have recognized a license
as a thing of value because it enhances the worth of such estate assets as
good will, stock, fixtures, and leaseholds.15 The majority of the instant
court, apparently disregarding these cases, considered the license a mere
privilege without sufficient property attributes to survive the licensee's
death or become an asset of his estate. In so doing, they held that under
the language of the Pennsylvania act a widow-personal representative could
elect the capacity in which she desired to secure the license.
Because of such statutory restrictions as the limitation on the number
of licenses to be issued in each municipality,16 the difficulty of securing
new licenses renders the right to transfer existing ones exceedingly
valuable. Moreover, if it is transferability, and not the license itself, which
is conceived of as providing the worth, the doctrinal difficulty of depriva-
tion of property at revocation, and the consequent hamstringing of the
board, is avoided.' 7  There would thus seem to be no compelling reason
for dealing with this attribute of value in privilege rather than property
terms in the present situation. Apparently recognizing this attribute, the
legislature, rather than permitting the license to die with the licensee,
10. State ex rel. Zeller v. Montgomery Circuit Court, 223 Ind. 476, 62 N.E.2d
149 (1945) ; State ex rel. Zugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 196 N.E. 664 (1935).
See Perry v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 180 Ore. 495, 177 P.2d 406 (1947);
McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 188 S.W.2d 745 (1945). See also Roehm v.
Orange County, 187 P.2d 49 (Cal. 1947), aff'd, 32 Cal.2d 280, 196 P.2d 550 (1948)
(property taxation) ; Novack v. Krauz, 138 N.J. Eq. 241, 47 A.2d 586 (1946) (con-
tract not binding to compel licensee to transfer license) ; Spankard's Liquor License
Case, 138 Pa. Super. 251, 10 A.2d 899 (1940) (license issuance). But cf. Toyos v.
Bruckman, 266 App. Div. 28, 41 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dep't 1943) (revocation).
11. Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397 (1941);
Green Mountain Post No. 1, American Legion v. Liquor Control Board, 94 A.2d 230
(Vt. 1953); see Gamble v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 323 Mich. 576, 578, 36 N.W.2d
297, 298 (1949).
12. In re Quaker Room, 90 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; In re Becker, 98 Fed.
407 (E.D. Pa. 1899).
13. Rowe v. Colpoys, 137 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
14. There are other instances in which licenses have been held to be property.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 248 P.2d 879 (1952) (sheriff's sale);
Cordano's Appeal, 91 Conn. 718, 101 Atl. 85 (1917) (assignment from judgment
creditor of original licensee) ; House v. Cotton, 52 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1951) (covenant
to reassign license). It has been suggested that where the statute permits transfer,
a license is a thing of value and therefore property. Rowe v. Colpoys, 137 F.2d 249
(D.C. Cir. 1943); Degginger v. Seattle Brewing Co., 41 Wash. 385, 83 Pac. 898
(1906). Another rationale regards a license as a mere privilege between the holder
and the state, but considers it a property right between the holder and third parties
where the right of transfer exists. Jaffe v. Pacific Brewing & Malting Co., 69 Wash.
308, 124 Pac. 1122 (1912).
15. Aschenbach v. Carey, 224 Pa. 303, 73 AtI. 435 (1909) ; Mueller's Estate, 190
Pa. 601, 42 AtI. 1021 (1899) ; Buck's Estate, 185 Pa. 57, 39 Atl. 821 (1898).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (Purdon 1952). ,See Pichler v. Snavely,
366 Pa. 568, 570, 79 A.2d 227, 228 (1951).
17. See note 11 supra.
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provided for its transfer to the spouse or personal representative of the
deceased holder.18 As the dissent points out,19 this provision was probably
intended to provide an interim holder of the license until settlement of the
estate in order to avoid the loss due to an interruption of the business when
there is no licensee to conduct it. It does not at any point purport to be
a statute of distribution to the named persons,20 and could hardly be said
to contravene the settled intestate scheme of the state in such implied
terms.2 ' Moreover, creditors of the estate are effectively excluded by the
instant court's result, making credit ventures by licensees with few other
assets next to impossible. In short, the purpose of the provision seems
to have been to increase the estate assets by maintaining the license intact
rather than diminishing them by the distribution of a windfall to the
spouse alone.
In addition to their actual holding, the majority's reasoning gives rise
to dubious implications. The court was forced to distinguish Aschenbach
v. Carey 2 in which it was held that a license was an asset of the estate
and its proceeds not subject to attachment by the personal creditors of the
licensee's administrator even though the latter had secured the transfer
of the license to himself. It did so on the ground that in Aschenbach the
administrator never claimed the license as his own and operated the busi-
ness solely for the benefit of the estate, while in the present case the widow-
administratrix always held it as hers and never accounted for it to the
estate.2 If this distinction were valid, it would seem that even a personal
representative who is not the surviving spouse may appropriate the license
if he evidences an intent to do so and never uses it for the benefit of the
estate. That the court contemplated this possibility appears unlikely in
view of prior cases which indicate otherwise 2 4 and in view of the high
duty of loyalty placed on a fiduciary.2 Furthermore, since the widow in
the instant case was also the administratrix of the estate and thus a
fiduciary, she would seem similarly compelled to secure the license for the
estate and bound to forego any possible statutory right to take the license
for herself as spouse.
26
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-468 (Purdon 1952).
19. Instant case at 56, 99 A.2d at 568.
20. Ibid.
21. For the Pennsylvania Intestate Act, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1.1, 1.17
(Purdon 1950).
22. 224 Pa. 303, 73 At. 435 (1909).
23. The court stated: "The principal difference between the Aschenbach case
and the instant matter is that in the Ascbenbach case the individual who held the
license used it for the benefit of the estate. In the instant case the surviving spouse
used the assets of the estate for her own benefit." Instant case at 46, 99 A.2d at
563-4.
24. In Aschenbach itself, the court said the administrator could not use the license
for his personal gain. Aschenbach v. Carey, 224 Pa. 303, 307, 73 At. 435, 436
(1909). See also Buck's Estate, 185 Pa. 57, 39 At. 821 (1898) (lower court opinion).
25. See BoGRT, TRUSTS § 95 (3d ed. 1951); LoRiNG, A TRusmE's HADBO o K
§ 18 (5th ed., Shattuck, 1940). The statement often appears that an executor or
administrator is a trustee. See, e.g., It re Noonan's Estate, 361 Pa. 26, 63 A.2d 80
(1949) ; Davies' Estate, 146 Pa. Super. 7, 21 A.2d 517 (1941).
26. See note 25 supra. This was the major ground given for the holding of the
lower court. Ryan Estate, 81 Pa. D. & C. 18 (1952).
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Internal Revenue-
ALLOCATION BY TAX COURT OF LUMP SUM LEGAL
FEE BETWEEN RECAPITALIZATION AND PARTIAL-
LIQUIDATION EXPENSES REVERSED; ENTIRE
AMOUNT NON-DEDUCTIBLE CAPITAL ITEM
The taxpayer, a closely held corporation, sold the assets of one part
of its operations and decided to distribute the proceeds of the sale to its
stockholders, thereby incurring a charge of $2,200,000 to its authorized
capital of $5,000,000. Compliance with New York law 1 then compelled a
recapitalization of the corporation to an authorized capital of $2,800,000.
A $20,000 legal fee for the complete transaction was paid in a lump sum;
the taxpayer claimed this entire amount as a deduction, but the commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency for the total amount. The Tax Court 2 allocated
50 percent of the fee to the cost of recapitalization (non-deductible as a
capital expenditure) 3 and 50 percent to the cost of distribution of assets
in a partial liquidation (deductible as an "ordinary and necessary" 4 busi-
ness expense). 5 On appeal by both parties, the circuit court held that
since both parts of the attorney's services were necessary steps in effecting
a transaction essentially a reorganization, the entire proceeding must be
viewed as a single transaction and, therefore, the entire fee is a capital
expenditure and non-deductible. Mills Estate v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d
244 (2d Cir. 1953).
Although considered separately liquidation expenses are deductible6
and recapitalization expenses non-deductible, 7 this is apparently the first
time both of these elements have arisen in one case. The concept which the
court uses, i.e. that the entire proceeding be viewed as a single transaction,
was adopted from- Case v. Commissioner,8 one of a group of -cases, each
employing similar language, where the issue decided was not related to the
1. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW, §§ 13, 36, 58, 59.
2. Mills Estate, Inc. v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 910 (1951), nondcquiesced in 1952-1
CuM. BULL. 6.
3. E.g., Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Comm'r, 122 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1941);
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Comm'r, 78 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1935); Emerson Elec.
Mfg. Co., 3 B.T.A. 932 (1926). See 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXA-
TION 357 (1942).
4. INT. -REv. CODE §23(a) (1) (A).
5. It has been consistently held that liquidation expenses are deductible. United
States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1953); Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v.
Comm'r, 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935) nonacquiesced in 1937-1 CuM. BULL. 45; Laster v.
Comm'r, 43 B.T.A. 159, 177 (1940) acquiesced in 1941-1 CUm. BULL. 7. See 4
MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 361 and n.49. The Tax Court held that the
expense of a partial liquidation is indistinguishable from expenses incurred in a
complete liquidation. In the instant case, the circuit court declined to pass on this
question. Instant case at 246.
6. See note 5 supra.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. 103 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1939).
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question of allocating expenses.9 In these cases, the courts refused to
segregate separate phases of integrated and preconceived plans adopted by
the taxpayers to circumvent § 112 10 and thereby derive the benefit of or an
exemption from a "no gain or loss" corporate reorganization. However,
support for the court's position is found in Robert Ehrlich, a case dealing
with allocation of repair and renovation costs,1 which held that when
ordinarily deductible expenditures are made in conjunction with overall
improvements of a capital nature, the deductible items lose their identity and
are disallowed.' 2 This doctrine evolved from language in Cowell v. Com-
missioner,13 but the court there also said that "it is impractical from the
evidence to make such a detailed classification of the items." 14 If the court
there only meant to hold that there was insufficient evidence before it to
make a classification,'5 the case is not precedent for cases where adequate
9. Survaunt v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Spirella Co. v. Comm'r,
155 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1946); Knapp Monarch Co. v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 59 (1942).
But cf. United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1953).
10. INT. REv. CODE § 112.
Benefit of a § 112 reorganization: In Case v. Comm'r, 103 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.
1939), the taxpayer and Corporation A entered into an agreement whereby Corpora-
tion A obtained all the capital stock of Corporation B in exchange for certain
assets of Corporation A. Up to this point, this transaction would have fallen within
§ 112, as Corporation A had the requisite "control" over Corporation B, and no
tax would be assessable on the gain. But the original agreement further provided
that the taxpayer would exchange his shares in Corporation A and receive all the
shares of Corporation B; this would not satisfy the "control" requirement of § 112
(b) (5) and § 112(h) because immediately after the exchange Corporation A in
reality was not in control of Corporation B, but taxpayer was. Since the original
agreement between taxpayer and Corporation A provided for both transactions,
the court said that both elements would not be separated to permit taxpayer to
obtain a tax advantage.
Exemption from a § 112 reorganization: In Spirella Co. v. Comm'r, supra
note 9, the taxpayer contended that a corporate reorganization was completed when
the corporation exchanged his old stock for lower-value new stock. INT. REv. CODE
§ 112(b) (3). If this was held to be the extent of the reorganization, then the
taxpayer would have incurred a deductible loss when the corporation bought back
1/2 of the new shares in order to reduce its capitalization. However, the entire
plan was adopted by one resolution, i.e., the devaluation and repurchase of the
shares, and the court refused to separate the two parts, holding that the loss could
not be recognized since the receipt of both stock and money brought the single
transaction within the provisions of § 112(e).
11. P-H 1951 TC MEm. DEc. [51,248 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 158 (1st Cir.
1952). The circuit court affirmed the Tax Court's decision without ruling directly
on this point. See 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 374.
12. Expenditures were made to recondition an abandoned building into a ware-
house, including expenses for fixing windows, small hardware, and miscellaneous
labor and materials. The court said that although "much" of the work done was
capital in nature, the balance ordinarily deductible "must be considered a part of
the entire capital investment...." Robert Ehrlich, P-H 1951 TC Mn2 . Dxc.
51,248 (1951).
13. 18 B.T.A. 997 (1930): "To fix a door or patch plaster might very well be
treated as an expense when it is an incidental minor item arising in the use of
property in carrying on business, and yet, as here, be properly capitalized when
involved in a greater plan of rehabilitation, -enlargement and improvement of the
entire property." Id. at 1002.
14. Ibid.
15. This is the interpretation adopted in Abe Wolkowitz, P-H 1949 TC MEM.
DEc. 49,212 (1949); ef. Everett L. Mills, P-H 1945 TC ME-. DEc. 45,283
(1945).
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evidence is available; if the court meant that it is too difficult to make a
classification in such cases, then the case is not controlling where a separa-
tion is possible.
Closely akin to the "single transaction" rule is the "main and primary
purpose" doctrine enunciated in Rassenfoss v. Commissioner.0  There
the court held that the issue of title to property was only incidental to the
main and primary purpose of a lawsuit which was for an accounting of
partnership funds, and held the entire attorney's fee to be deductible al-
though, admittedly, part of the attorney's efforts was directed toward
defense of title--an otherwise non-deductible item. Applying the Rassen-
foss doctrine to the instant case, the main and primary purpose of the
taxpayer was partial liquidation, recapitalization merely being a forced
incident to it,'1 7 and therefore the entire amount should be deductible.' s
Contrasted to the all or nothing rules discussed above is the doctrine of
allocation, i.e., attributing to both deductible and non-deductible items their
proportionate share of a total expense. Allocation of legal fees between
deductible and non-deductible expenses where both arose in the same pro-
ceeding has ample precedent. 19 In Helvering v. Stormfelt, °20 where a
16. 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946); Safety Tube Corp. v. Comm'r, 168 F.2d
787 (6th Cir. 1948); Midco Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. No. 79 (June 1953);
cf. Hochschild v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947).
17. In the statement of facts in the instant case the court clearly points
out that the taxpayer first decided on partial liquidation, and then a re-
capitalization was forced on it by New York law. Instant case at 244. However, the
court seemed to forget this when it said that the taxpayer ". . . underwent a re-
capitalization to give itself the capital structure it determined was best suited to
carrying on that part of the business it was to continue." Instant case at 246. In effect,
the court is basing its decision on the requirements of a state statute; since New York
requires a complete recapitalization to effectuate the instant partial liquidation, every
expense connected with the entire transaction acquires the taint of a non-deductible
capital expenditure, even though the expenses directly attributable to the partial
liquidation would ordinarly be deductible items (see note 5 supra). If, however, the
taxpayer were a Massachusetts' corporation, it seems that a recapitalization would
not have been necessary; the amount could have been distributed as a dividend.
The Massachusetts' law regarding dividends has only the requirement that a dividend
not render a corporation insolvent (MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 158, §44 (1948); cf.
Pennsylvania Iron Works Co. v. Mackenzie, 190 Mass. 61, 76 N.E. 228 (1906)),
whereas New York law (see note 1 supra) proscribes any disbursement which would
impair the capital of the corporation even though the corporation might be fully
competent to meet its obligations after the dividend. This variance demonstrates
the effect of deciding strictly federal issues on the basis of the state law--"It would
introduce variations into the statute's' operation as wide as the differences the forty-
eight states . . . make . . . for wholly different purposes." NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 122-123 (1944). The deductible nature of an
expense incurred in a partial-liquidation, or in similar transactions, would then
depend not upon construction and interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, but
solely by chance on the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer is incorporated. To
illustrate the variety of decisions possible by adopting the court's rationale in the
instant case, there are at least five different restrictions on corporate, dividends
which might or might not require recapitalization in different situations. See
Ballantine and Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions upon Dividends under
Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 229, 238 et seq. (1935) which dis-
cusses four categories of statutes, but omits the Massachusetts' rule.
18. See argument to same effect in Tax Barometer, Aug. 15, 1953, p. 2.
19. E.g., Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944); Coke v.
Comm'r 17 T.C. 403 (1951) (and cases cited therein); LeMond v. Comm'r, 13
T.C. 670 (1949).
20. 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944).
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lump sum was paid for legal services to recover embezzled funds, the
circuit court allocated the fee: part to the recovery of principal, a non-
deductible capital item; and part to the recovery of interest, a deductible
item. There is no question as to the validity of the doctrine of allocation,21
and it is deeply ingrained into income tax procedure, being used constantly
in apportionment between capital and non-capital items,- personal and
business expenses,2 personal and non-business expenses,24 and taxable
and exempt income.2 When allocation is permitted of lump sum pay-
ments,2 6 the taxpayer has the burden of either showing an actual alloca-
tion or supplying proof of expenditures upon which a reasonable alloca-
tion can be made, otherwise the claimed deduction will be disallowed.
27
The court in adopting the "one transaction" rationale in the instant
case not only extends the Cowell doctrine but also fails to explain why a
deductible item should be disallowed because it is part of a non-deductible
transaction; it offers no reason for its holding beyond the doctrine itself.
The related "main and primary purpose" rule of the Rassenfoss case
suffers the same failure to explain, whether applied to disallow a deductible
or to allow a non-deductible item. The doctrine of allocation, however,
has been properly described as "a rational method of distribution of
expense." 28s When part of an expense has been held to be deductible,
although absolute certainty is not required,2 9 arbitrary allocations are to be
condemned. The "50-50" division, made by the Tax Court in the instant
case may in fact be as valid an allocation as possible, but that court seemed
to base its decision solely on the fact that there were two phases of work
21. Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941); see Note, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV.
251, 261 (1948).
22. 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 340, 368.
23. 4 id. at 335, 483.
24. 4 id. at 443 (Supp. 1953).
25. 4 id. at 531; Muir v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1950).
26. E.g., Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 106 (1950).
27. Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 590 (1943). There are two
views regarding the weight of the burden upon the taxpayer. Beginning with
Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930), the doctrine has developed that
even though the taxpayer makes no allocation and the lack of evidence will not
permit a precise allocation, where, in fact, deductible costs have been incurred the
Tax Court should make as close an approximation as it can. The rationale of this
view is that to allow nothing is inconsistent with the Tax Court saying something
was spent. E.g., Rugel v. Comm'r, 127 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942) ; cf. Muir v. Comm'r,
182 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1950). The pre-Cohan view, which still has life today,
would disallow deductions under similar circumstances. E.g., Highland v. Comm'r,
43 B.T.A. 598, 610 (1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1942); United Carbon
Co. v. Comn'r, 32 B.T.A. 1000, 1009 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 90 F.2d 43 (4th
Cir. 1937); Donald v. Smith, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEC. 147,137 (1947); cf. Crowley
v. Comm'r, 89 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1937); see Note, 97 U. oF PA. -L. Rav. 251, 261-2
(1948); 4 MaRTENS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 335 and n.26, n.27; 4 id. at 340 and
n.49, n.51; 4 id. at 368 and n.63; 4 id. at 483 and n.71, n.72.
The difference between the two views is pointed up by judge Frank's dissenting
opinion in Hochschild v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 817, 820 (2d Cir. 1947).
28. Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1944).
29. See note 26, supra.
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involved. Obviously, one part may have taken much more time and effort
than the other.30 It seems that the best solution to this case would have
been to remand it to permit allocation to be made on more reasonable
grounds.
Labor Law-
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES HELD COVERED
BY UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT
Plaintiff, a manufacturer of goods for interstate commerce, filed suit
under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,' alleging that defendant union had
breached the collective bargaining agreement between the parties by calling
a strike of plaintiff's employees. Defendant moved for a stay pursuant to
§ 3 of the United States Arbitration Act,2 pending arbitration of the suit
as provided by the contract. The district court's denial of the stay was
reversed, the circuit court holding that the- employees were not "engaged
in interstate commerce" within the meaning of the exclusion clause of § 1
of the Act 3 and were therefore entitled to a stay under § 3. Tenney
Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of
America, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
4
The United States Arbitration Act, designed to abrogate the common-
law rule that arbitration agreements were revocable and unenforceable,5
was passed in recognition of the need for more rapid methods for the
settlement of disputes than were obtainable in the courts.6 It provides in
§ 2 that arbitration provisions in "any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrev-
ocable, and enforceable. .. ." Under § 3, if any suit is brought in a
federal court upon an issue referable to arbitration, a stay of such action is
to be granted pending arbitration in accordance with the agreement.3
30. See Tobacco Products Export Corp. v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 1100 (1952).
1. 61 STAT. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1947).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. 1947).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1947). See text at note 10 infra.
4. Three judges decided the case on this ground, two concurred on the ground
that collective bargaining agreements were not contracts of employment under the
exclusion clause, and two judges dissented.
5. This rule applies only to executory agreements; if an arbitration award is
finally made, it is enforceable at law or equity. Masury v. Whiton, 111 N.Y. 679, 18
N.E. 638 (1888) ; Jarvis v. Fountain Water Co., 5 Cal. 179 (1855) ; see Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 (1924); RESTATEMENT, CONm crS
§ 445 (1932). For an historical discussion of the common law rule, see Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir. 1942) ; SEN. REP.
No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1923); Comment, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678, 679 (1948).
6. 66 CONG. REc. 984 (1924); 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1923).
7. 9 U.S.C. §2 (Supp. 1947).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. 1947).
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Finally, § 4 of the Act authorizes the specific enforcement of* agreements
to arbitrate.9 Section 1, however, after defining "maritime transactions"
and "commerce," closes with the provision that "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." o
Heretofore, although construing the Act liberally elsewhere," the lower
federal courts have been in sharp disagreement as to whether or not
collective bargaining agreements are subject to the provisions of the
Arbitration Act. Certain of these agreements were first held to be subject
to the Act when the Third Circuit, without considering the exclusion
clause, granted under § 3 of the Act a stay pending arbitration, holding
that because that section was merely procedural it was not limited to
arbitration agreements made valid and enforceable under § 2 of the Act.'
2
But the more typical approach has been to examine whether or not collec-
tive bargaining agreements are "contracts of employment" within the
exclusion clause of § 1 and, if so, whether they are thereby exempted from
the Act's coverage. Thus, the Third Circuit, in affirming the reasoning
of their earlier decision, considered the exclusion clause, but held that it
limits only the definition of "commerce" wherever that word appears in
the Act, and since the term is not contained in § 3 the exclusion clause
does not impair the right to a stay pending arbitration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement.18 After re-affirming this view in two subsequent
cases,14 this circuit reached a contrary result in the two Greyhound cases,15
holding that the bar of the exclusion clause extended to the entire Act.
The court then held that the collective bargaining agreement of the employee
bus drivers was a contract of employment within the exclusion of "con-
tracts of employment . . . of workers . . . engaged in interstate com-
merce" and thus not subject to arbitration under the Act. In overruling
its previous holdings that the exclusion clause was limited only to the
definitions, the court relied on the fact that in the 1947 codification of the
Act, Congress included as the catchline of § 1: "'Maritime Transactions'
9. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. 1947).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1947).
11. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449
(1935), affirming, 70 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942); Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United
States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,
77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. 1948). See discussion in Sturges and Murphy, Some
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act,
17 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 580, 582-93 (1952).
12. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943). No
attempt is made here to criticize the interpretation given these sections in this first
Donahue case, although such construction is used in the instant case. For such a
criticism see Sturges and Murphy, supra note 11, at 585-98.
13. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 777 (1946).
14. Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948); Donahue v. Sus-
quehanna Collieries Co., 160 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1947).
15. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Bus Lines, 192 F2d 310
(3d Cir. 1951); Pennsylvania Greyhound Bus Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 193 F.2d
327 (3d Cir. 1952).
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and 'Commerce' defined; exceptions to operation of title." 16 This, they
held, clearly indicated that the exclusion clause was to extend to the entire
Act.17 The confusion existing in the Third Circuit as to proper subjects
of arbitration has been reflected in conflicting decisions elsewhere. The
Sixth Circuit has held that collective bargaining agreements are contracts
of employment covered by the exclusion clause and has refused a stay
pending arbitration in a dispute between the UMW and a colliery.18  On
the contrary, some district courts,
1 9 and two judges in the instant case,
20
have held that collective bargaining agreements are not contracts of em-
ployment. However, no court prior to the instant one has ever attempted
to define the scope of the phrase "engaged in interstate commerce." This
case is thus the first to grant a stay pending arbitration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement under the Act not by interpreting the phrase "contract
of employment" but by drastically limiting the scope of the exclusion
clause through a restrictive interpretation of the phrase "engaged in
commerce."
The legislative history of the Act is inconclusive as to the reason for
or meaning of the exclusion clause. It was added by the American Bar
Association committee which drafted the Act, at the request of the presi-
dent of the Seaman's Union, who contended that seamen's employment,
already provided with arbitration procedures under admiralty jurisdic-
tion,21 should not be subject to this Act.22  This would also explain the
inclusion of railroad workers 2 but leaves the meaning of "any other class
16. This catchline was not included in the original Act, 43 STAT. 883 (1925).
It is found in 29 U.S.C. § 1 (1946), but was apparently added by the codifier.
17. The court apparently overlooked the fact that Congress intended no change
in the law in the codification. [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. SERvicE 1515. However, the
court may have used this reasoning merely as a convenient means of overruling the
earlier cases. See International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hard-
wood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33, 38 (4th Cir. 1948).
18. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). This decision was
followed by the Fourth Circuit in International Union United Furniture Workers v.
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., supra note 17, although that circuit follows the
interpretation of § 3 advocated by the Third Circuit in the first Donahue case.
Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944). See also
text at note 12 supra. The Tenth Circuit has also followed the Gatliff case in
Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, CIO, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.
1951). Many regard it as settled that the Act is not applicable to collective bar-
gaining agreements. See, e.g., Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,
CIO, supra at 983; 53 COL. L. REv. 1019 (1953); 65 HA v. L. Ray. 1239 (1951).
19. Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers of America, 95 F.' Supp. 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); United Office & Professional Workers v. Monumental Ins. Co., 88
F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (decided prior to the Greyhound cases); cf. Levy v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 104 P.2d 770 (1940) (collective bargaining agreement
not a "contract pertaining to labor" under California Arbitration Act). These cases
rely on J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (individual contracts between
employer and employees do not affect employer's obligation to bargain collectively
with certified union since a collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of
employment and will not directly affect the terms of the individual contracts).
20. Instant case at 454.
21. 17 STAT. 267 (1872), as amended, 60 STAT. 1097, 46 U.S.C. § 651 (1946).
22. 48 A.B.A. REP. 287 (1923).
23. Railroad workers were provided with arbitration procedures by 41- STAT. 469
(1920). -See also 44 STAT. 582 (1926), as amended, 48 STAT. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1946).
RECENT CASES
of workers" in doubt. The chairman of the ABA committee, in his testi-
mony before the Senate subcommittee, stated that the Act was not meant
to provide for industrial arbitration.2 4  The remaining Congressional
pronouncements merely indicated that the aim of the Act was to provide for
commercial arbitration; there is no mention whatsoever of labor relations.
On the other hand, at the present time the value and benefit to be gained
from the arbitration of labor disputes is widely recognized.2 6  The fact
that, although arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements are
very common, there have been comparatively few disputes concerning their
enforceability, would indicate that both labor and management recognize
the advantages of this remedy 27 In addition, there have been congressional
declarations favoring the principle of arbitration in labor disputes. 28
The court in this case adopts a new approach in order to resolve the
disparity between the legislative history of the Act, which indicates that at
least some collective bargaining agreements were meant to be excluded
from the Act, and the modern policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes.
In reaffirming the holding that collective bargaining agreements are con-
tracts of employment, the court apparently felt obliged to give some mean-
ing to the exclusion clause in light of the one apparent reason for its addi-
tion.29 An explanation of why the term "collective bargaining agreement"
was not used specifically in the Act is that this phrase was not, in 1925,
the term of art which it is now. If such contracts were meant to be covered
by the exclusion clause, it is probable that Congress thought that they
would be included under the phrase "contract of employment." However,
the desirability of arbitration procedures in labor relations, gives the court
some warrant for restricting the clause to its narrowest coverage. "En-
gaged in interstate commerce" in 1925 referred to the actual crossing of
state lines 80 and has substantially the same meaning today-manufacturing
employees being described as "producing goods for commerce" 31 or "affect-
ing commerce." 82 Moreover, this decision is consistent with the prevailing
24. Hearings before Subcommittee on the Judiciary on S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th
Sess. 9 (1923) (testimony of Mr. Piatt).
25. See note 6 supra. See also SEN. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924); H. R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
26. See United Office & Professional Workers v. Monumental Ins. Co., 88 F.
Supp. 602, 607 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 703-5, 104
P.2d 770, 775-6 (1940); Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 370, 160 P.2d
421, 424 (1945) (concurring opinion). See Taylor, The Arbitration of Labor Dis-
putes, 1 ARB. J. (N.s.) 409 (1946); Comment, 43 Irl.. L. REv. 678, 691 (1948); 28
N.C.L. REv. 225, 228, n.21 (1950).
27. See Oliver, The Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 83 U. oF PA. L. REv. 206, 219
(1934) ; Taylor, supra note 26.
28. E.g., SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
29. See text at note 22 supra.
30. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
31. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT. 911
(1948), 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1952) (Fair Labor Standards Act); United States
v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
32. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 136, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1947) (National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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interpretation that § 3, being procedural, is not limited to the disputes
enumerated in § 2.83 Congress in 1925 recognized that arbitration was a
procedural remedy which is available to any dispute in federal court in-
cluding diversity cases and is not limited by the substantive restrictions of
the commerce clause.8 4 Since without the phrase "engaged in interstate
commerce" the exclusion clause would cover all contracts of employment,
the addition of that phrase can only serve to restrict the scope of the clause
to a specified class of workers.
85
A further consideration leads to the same conclusion. Section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act 3 6 has been held to permit specific enforcement
of arbitration agreements in collective bargaining contracts in federal
court 7 However, it remains to be determined under what system of
procedure the enforcement is to be ordered. Unless the bar presented by
the exclusion clause is removed, the procedures must be left to either a fed-
eral common law 88 or the vagaries of state statutes.3 9 Either is so un-
33. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449
(1935), affirming, 70 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United
States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Donghue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138
F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364
(D. Neb. 1948).
34. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). Cf. Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
35. It can be argued that Congress intended the Act to apply only to the disputes
enumerated in § 2. See Sturges and Murphy, supra note 11, at 583-7. The exclusion
clause would then serve to prevent the Act from being applied in any labor dispute
which it would otherwise cover if "transactions involving commerce" and "engaged
in interstate commerce" are co-extensive in meaning. However, this view is incon-
sistent with the prevailing interpretation of § 3. See text at note 33 supra. At least
one court has adopted both views. Compare International Union United Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948), with
Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944).
An added consideration of the instant interpretation is that it allows even personal
service contracts of employment to be arbitrated.
36. See note 1 supra.
37. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass.
1953). See 53 CoL. L. REv. 1019 (1953) ; 67 HARv. L. REv. 181 (1953).
38. See Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806, 809
(2d Cir. 1950) (implying federal common law should govern). See discussion of
this point in Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., supra note 37, at 139-40.
39. The American Thread case, supra note 37, raises the question of the scope of
the specific enforcement provisions of §4. In the instant case, the court considers
this remedy, together with the specific arbitration procedures to be followed, to be
a matter of state law. Instant case at 454, n.15. The language of § 4 lends itself to
the same interpretation which has been given § 3. It would then follow that the
subsequent sections of the Act describing the arbitration procedures to be followed
would also apply to any dispute in federal court whether or not involving interstate
commerce. See Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., supra note 37, at 142,
in which the parties in their arbitration agreement had not provided for an arbitrator.
The court ordered that the provisions of § 5 of the Act be used as a "guiding analogy,"
and if the parties could not agree upon an arbitrator within ten days, the court would
appoint one. There seems to be no constitutional bar to this broad interpretation of
the Act. Compare Red Cross Line v. American Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924), with
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943). See also, Sturges
and Murphy, supra note 11, at 587-98. If, however, § 4 applies only to the disputes
enumerated in § 2, a collective bargaining agreement might still be covered by the
language of the latter section as a ". . . contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce. . . ." Such a contract would not require that the individual workers
themselves be engaged in'interstate commerce and consequently, the exclusion clause
would not always be applicable if the interpretation by the instant court is followed.
See instant case at 454.
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certain that the decree ordering specific enforcement would often be
meaningless. A broadened application of the provisions of the Arbitration
Act would do much to remove this uncertainty.
Nationality-
CITIZEN CANNOT EXPATRIATE HIMSELF UNDER
ACT OF 1940 UNTIL HE BECOMES AWARE
THAT HE IS A CITIZEN
Plaintiff, the son of an Italian born, naturalized American citizen,
was born in Italy on November 24, 1913, thus acquiring American citizen-
ship through his father.1 He was raised in Italy, and in 1928, without
losing his American citizenship,2 he also acquired Italian citizenship through
his father's repatriation as an Italian citizen. In May, 1947, the plaintiff
learned from the United States consul at Naples that he might have a claim
to American citizenship. He subsequently wrote several letters to the
consul concerning his citizenship, and on January 4, 1949, filed application
for registration as an American citizen, which was denied on the grounds
that plaintiff had expatriated himself. On appeal the district court affirmed
the denial; - the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case for further findings of fact, holding, inter alia,5 that the
two year statutory period within which plaintiff had. to return to the United
States in order to avoid expatriation under the Nationality Act of 1940 6
1. "All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and juris-
diction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth
citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States .. " REV. STAT.
§1993 (1875), 8 U.S.C. §6 (1934).
2. Where an American citizen is naturalized in a foreign state, his American
citizenship must be deemed to continue unless he has been deprived of it through the
operation of a treaty or congressional enactment. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329
(1939).
3. "Article XII. Minor non-emancipated children of those who acquire or re-
acquire citizenship, become citizens. .. "
"Article IX. He who has lost citizenship . . . may reacquire it:
(3) After two years of residence in the kingdom. . . ." Italian Nationality
Law (1912).
4. Perri v. Acheson, 105 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.J. 1952).
5. It had also been alleged that the plaintiff had expatriated himself by serving
in the Italian army, 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(c) (1946), by swearing an
oath of allegiance to the King of Italy, 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801 (b) (1946),
and by voting in Italian political elections, 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(e)
(1946). On these points the court held that plaintiff's oath of allegiance and service
in the army were not voluntary and, therefore, did not constitute expatriation, and
according to a subsequent statute plaintiff was not expatriated by voting in political
elections in Italy between January 1, 1946 and April 18, 1948, provided that he
take certain oaths of allegiance to the United States. 65 STAT. 191 (1951), as
amended, 66 STAT. 278 (1952).
6. "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (a) Obtaining naturalization in a foreign
state, either upon his own application or through the naturalization of a parent having
legal custody of such person: Provided, however, That nationality shall not be lost
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did not start to run until plaintiff became aware that he was an American
citizen.7 Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953).
The Constitution does not delegate to Congress express power to de-
prive citizens of the United States of their citizenship,8 but the Supreme
Court has found the congressional power to expatriate implied in the fact
that the United States is a sovereign state.9 In 1940 Congress passed a
nationality law, section 401 of which provides for loss of nationality by
American citizens upon performance by them of any one of several specified
acts, including attaining naturalization in a foreign state, 10 swearing an
oath of allegiance to a foreign state,"- serving in the armed forces of a
foreign state,'2 and voting in a foreign political election.' s  Section 401 (a)
allows a citizen facing expatriation because of naturalization in a foreign
country through his parents to maintain his citizenship by returning to the
United States before his twenty-third birthday or before two years from
the effective date of the act whichever is longer. 14 It has been held that
where it was impossible for the citizen to return during the required period
because of World War II, the statute was tolled,'5 one court holding that
when the period starts running again after the war, it runs for a reasonable
as a result of the naturalizatioi of a parent unless and until the child shall have at-
tained the age of twenty-three years without acquiring permanent residence in the
United States: Provided further, That a person who has acquired foreign nationality
through the naturalization of his parent or parents, and who at the same time is a
citizen of the United States, shall, if abroad and he has not heretofore expatriated
himself as an American citizen by his own voluntary act, be permitted within two
years from the effective date of his [sic] chapter to return to the United States and
take up permanent residence therein, and it shall thereafter be deemed that he has
elected to be an American citizen. Failure on the part of such person to so return
and take up permanent residence in the United States during such period shall be
deemed to be a determination on the part of such person to discontinue his status
as an American citizen, and such person shall be forever estopped by such failure
from thereafter claiming such American citizenship ... " 54 STAT. 1168 (1940),
8 U.S.C. § 801(a) (1946).
"This chapter shall take effect from and after ninety days from October 14,
1940." 54 STAT. 1174 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 906 (1946).
7. On the question of the plaintiff's alleged expatriation under § 401 (a) of the
Act for acquiring naturalization in Italy through his father and failing to return
within the time allotted by the statute, the court also held that the period was tolled
during the war and that application for permission to return rather than actual return
to the United States within the allotted period was sufficient.
8. Congress has the expressed power: "To establish an uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 8. In interpreting that power the Supreme
Court once said, "The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution,
is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away." United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).
9. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
10. 54 STAT. 1168 (194Q1), 8 U.S.C. § 801(a) (1946).
11. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801(b) (1946).
12. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(c) (1946).
13. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §801(e) (1946).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. Peduzzi v. Brownell, 113 F. Supp. 419 (D.D.C. 1953); Gualco v. Acheson,
106 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1952); see Application of Bernasconi, 113 F. Supp. 71,
75 (N.D. Cal. 1953). But see Gaudio v. Dulles, 110 F. Supp. 706, 710 (D.D.C.
1953) ; Mastrocola v. Acheson, 105 F. Supp. 580, 581-582 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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time, not necessarily the period which remains of the original two years. 18
The instant case holds not only that the war tolled the statute but also that
the period did not start to run until the plaintiff became aware that he was
an American citizen.
Courts have uniformly agreed that, although a citizen could not be
expatriated for involuntary performance of the acts specified in section
401,17 "due process" does not require consideration of the citizen's intent
except as manifested by his overt actions. Thus, ignorance of what one
was signing, when in fact it was an oath of allegiance to the King of Italy,18
ignorance of the legal implications of voting in foreign elections, 19 and
ignorance of one's American citizenship when joining a foreign army and
swearing allegiance to the King of Italy 20 have been held to be immaterial
to voluntary expatriation, even though in each case the plaintiff claimed
that he would not have so acted had he anticipated loss of nationality.2 1
Although it is logically difficult to hold that plaintiff voluntarily expatriated
himself when he did not even know that he was an American citizen, it is
claimed that to hold otherwise would result in a completely unworkable
law.2 The instant case, however, departs from precedent by making
material, in addition to plaintiff's overt acts, his lack of knowledge that
he was an American citizen.
The previou.s cases may be distinguished on the ground that the acts
there involved-namely, swearing allegiance to a foreign state, joining a
foreign army, and voting in a foreign election-were totally inconsistent
with loyalty to any country except the one in favor of which the act was
performed. A similar implication of disloyalty could not as easily be drawn
from the events which allegedly expatriated the plaintiff in the instant
case: achieving foreign naturalization through his parent and failing to
16. Gualco v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 760, 767 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
17. Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1953) (involuntary military
service and oath of allegiance not expatriating); Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (involuntary military service not expatriating); Pandolfo v.
Acheson, 202 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1953) (involuntary military service and oath of
allegiance not expatriating); Podea v. Acheson, 179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950) (invol-
untary military service and oath of allegiance not expatriating); Acheson v. Mura-
kami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949) (involuntary renunciation of citizenship not
expatriating); Doreau v. Marshall, 170 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1948) (naturalization in
occupied France to avoid being put in concentration camp as enemy alien not
expatriating) ; Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, 161 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1947)
(involuntary military service not expatriating).
18. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950) ; Revedin v. Acheson,
194 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1952).
19. Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Acheson v. Mariko
Kuniyuki, 190 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1951); see Kasumi Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F.
Supp. 11, 12 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
20. Cantoni v. Acheson, 88 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1950) ; see also A Letter of
Instructions from the Department of State to the Consular Officer at Sio Paulo,
published in 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (1942) wherein the
Department stated that naturalization in Germany was expatriating even though the
citizen had not been aware that he was an American.
21. See also Federici v. Miller, 99 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (expatriation
held voluntary even though plaintiff did not know legal consequences of joining
foreign army and swearing allegiance to foreign state).
22. See Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445, 453 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
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return to the United States within two years of the effective date of the
statute. But in the statute there is no indication that Congress intended
higher standards of volition to be required for expatriation under sub-
section (a) than for any of the other sub-sections of section 401. There-
fore, rather than interpreting parallel sections differently, the court in
the instant case should have faced the constitutional issue raised by the
cases which hold that voluntary performance of the acts specified in sec-
tion 401 results in expatriation regardless of the undisclosed intent of the
actor. The courts have continually avoided constitutional problems by
reading into section 401 a requirement that the expatriatee act voluntarily
to an extent which the respective court deems sufficient to satisfy the Con-
stitution. This practice results in the terms of the statute being interpreted
differently by different courts, depending upon the scope of the congres-
sional power to expatriate as each court sees it.2 These conflicts can be
eliminated only by a definitive decision by the Supreme Court which will
not be had so long as courts continue to avoid questions of constitutionality
by finding a choice of statutory interpretation where none exists.
Although the Nationality Act of 1940 was replaced by the McCarran-
Walter Act in 1952, section 349(a) 24 of the latter statute is in essence
a re-enactment of the loss of nationality provisions of the earlier law with
a few minor changes and additions.2 One important addition, however,
23. E.g., The mere fact that an American citizen is conscripted into a foreign
army is not sufficient evidence of duress to prevent expatriation. Minoru Hamamoto
v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ; Toshio Kondo v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp.
884 (S.D. Cal. 1951); see Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
The fact that an American citizen is conscripted into a foreign army is prima fade
evidence of involuntariness. Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1953). For
conflict as to whether the war tolled the period of grace allowed in § 401 (a) see note
16 mpra.
24. 66 STAT. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a) (Supp. 1953). See also §§451-3
of proposed Immigration and Citizenship Act of 1953 (Mimeo. Draft No. 3, July,
1953), introduced as S.R. 2545, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 10898 (July 31,
1953), in which the provisions of § 349(a) of the McCarran Act are re-drafted. Loss
of citizenship because of obtaining naturalization in a foreign state on one's own
application is provided for in § 451 (3) of the proposed draft, but this section specifically
requires that the naturalization be "without compulsion." Under §452(1) a minor
who "without compulsion" obtains naturalization in a foreign state (presumably
upon his own application or through his parent) loses his American citizenship if"without good cause" he fails to return to this country and establish permanent resi-
dence by his twenty-fifth birthday. There, of course, will still be the problem of
interpreting "without compulsion" and "without good cause." Section 453 provides
for loss of American citizenship of a person under twenty-one whose parent is
expatriated under the statute and who fails to return to this country by his twenty-
fifth birthday. There is no requirement that the failure to return under this section
be without good cause. A person under twenty-one whose American parent is
expatriated because of obtaining naturalization in a foreign state would be liable for
expatriation under either §452(1) or §453. It is not clear whether his failure to
return to the United States by his twenty-fifth birthday with good cause would result
in his expatriation.
25. The period of grace allowed a person facing expatriation because of his
naturalization in a foreign state through his parents was extended from his twenty-
third birthday to his twenty-fifth birthday. 66 STAT. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1481(a) (1) (Supp. 1953). Having or acquiring the nationality of a foreign country
in whose armed forces a person serves is no longer required for loss of nationality
because of such service. 66 STAT. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (a) (3) (Supp.
1953). A citizen may now be expatriated for remaining outside the United States
in order to avoid military training in the armed forces of the United States. 66 STAT.
267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (a) (10) (Supp. 1953).
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is embodied in section 349(b), which provides that where a person per-
forms an act specified to be expatriating,26 there is a conclusive presump-
tion that he acted voluntarily if at the time of the act he was a citizen
of the state wherein the act was performed and had been present in that
state for a "period or periods totaling ten years or more immediately prior
to such act." 2 7  When a case with the proper facts is presented the ex-
plicit language of this section should make it more difficult for courts
to avoid a constitutional decision by reading a requirement of voluntariness
into the statute. Such a decision in the near future is unlikely since most
of the cases arising today in which voluntariness is an issue still involve
acts performed during World War II, thus coming under the Act of
1940.28
Valuation-
CAB PERMITS WRITE-UP IN THE VALUATION OF
ASSETS TRANSFERRED TO A NEW CARRIER TO
RESULT IN INCREASED AIR MAIL SUBSIDIES
In a recent merger with Empire Air Lines,1 West Coast Airlines, Inc.
acquired, for $431,000, certain aircraft which had been carried on the
books of Empire at a value of $96,432. Since, under the subsidy provisions
of the Air Commerce Act of 1938,2 the Civil Aeronautics Board attempts
to set a rate of compensation for carrying air mail which will enable each
air line to earn a fair return on its investment,3 the CAB was required
26. The acts are the same in the McCarran-Walter Act as they were in the
Nationality Act of 1940 with the exception of the changes indicated in note 25 supra.
27. 66 STAT. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(b) (Supp. 1953). This provision
would not apply to loss of nationality because of naturalization in a foreign state,
66 STAT. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a) (1) (Supp. 1953), since at the time he
performed the act for which he is being expatriated the person was not a national of
the state in which he performed the act.
28. The McCarran Act is not retroactive. 66 STAT. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1481(a) (Supp. 1953).
1. West Coast-Empire Merger Case, C.A.B. Order No. E-6550 (June 27, 1952).
2. 52 STAT. 998 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §486 (1946). Section 486(b) of the Act
provides: "In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation under
this section, the Board . . . may fix different rates for different air carriers or
classes of air carriers . . . In determining the rate in each case, the Board shall
take into consideration, among other factors . . . the need of each such air carrier
for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance
of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such
air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and con-
tinue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character and
quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the
national defense."
3. The Board expressly computed return on investment for the first time in Delta
Air Corporation-Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 261 (1942). The Board has consistently fol-
lowed this policy since then. See West Coast Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, C.A.B.
Order No. E-7412 (May 26, 1953). Return on investment is not necessarily equal for
all carriers. The CAB has rewarded efficient management with higher returns in
some cases. E.g., Colonial Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 4 C.A.B. 71, 78 (1942). In
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to set a valuation for rate making purposes on these transferred aircraft.
Despite objections by the Post Office Department,4 the CAB recognized
a valuation of $181,724 for the aircraft (cost to West Coast minus depre-
ciation already allowed Empire). West Coast Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates,
C.A.B. Order No. E-7698 (Sept. 10, 1953).
The effect of the Board's order is to increase government subsidy pay-
ments since the aircraft now form a higher base on which to determine
return on investment and since the higher book value of the aircraft will
permit West Coast to charge more to the expense of depreciation than
Empire would have been able to do in a similar period. Depreciation ex-
pense, like other legitimate costs of doing business, 5 must be offset by
subsidies when non-mail revenues are insufficient.8 Previous CAB policy
prohibited any increase in the value for rate-making purposes of assets
transferred through the merger or sale of air lines.7 This policy was
intended to relieve the government of the necessity to subsidize depre-
ciation of assets already depreciated at government expense.8  It was felt
that any retreat from this policy would encourage air lines to transfer assets
merely to increase air mail subsidies.9 The Board ascribes its present
deviation to "exceptional circumstances" in the West Coast-Empire case.
Actually, however, the ruling merely represents a reluctance by the CAB
to impose any unnecessary obstacles to the present merger.10 West Coast
Capital Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 926, 930 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 875 (1950), the court stated that Congress did not intend to indemnify
carriers against loss or to guarantee any return whatsoever on their investment.
4. The Post Office Department must make the mail payments to the airlines and
annually requests from Congress the funds necessary to meet the air mail rates
(including subsidy) fixed by the CAB. The Post Office Department, therefore, is an
interested party to all CAB rate determination proceedings. In Seaboard & Western
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963
(1950), it was held that the presence of the Postmaster General at these proceedings
was intended to protect the public interest
5. See City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 9 (1909); BAUER
AND GOLD, PuBLIC UTILITY VALUATION FOR PURPOSES OF RATE CONTROL 203, 213
(1934).
6. Depreciation is added to the other operating expenses of the carrier in deter-
mining the amount of subsidy needed. E.g., Frontier Airlines Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
E-6214 (March 13, 1952); Trans-Texas Airways, C.A.B. Order No. E-4419 (July
21, 1950).
7. This general policy was first expressed in United Air Lines, Inc.-Western Air
Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947) and was
reiterated in Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246 (1950).
8. West Coast-Empire Merger Case, C.A.B. Order No. E-6550, 4 (June 27,
1952).
9. See cases cited note 7 =spra. See also Ryan, Chairman, concurring and dis-
senting. "This is a compromise of principle which is likely to have a profound effect
on all mergers and acquisitions in the future. It can become the entering wedge by
which the existing assets of numerous companies can be inflated, the return to stock-
holders substantially increased, and the cost to the government, and ultimately the
consumer, raised." Id. at 2 of dissent.
10. The CAB recently had been forced, due to circumstances beyond the con-
trol of West Coast, to disapprove its proposed merger with Southwest Airways Co.
Southwest-West Coast Merger Case, C.A.B. Order No. E-5594 (Aug. 7, 1951). The
CAB therefore was ". . . reluctant to impose any more obstacles to the successful
outcome of the present merger proposal than are absolutely necessary." West Coast-
Empire Merger Case, C.A.B. Order No. E-6550, 6 (June 27, 1952).
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argued that it would have been unable to make any profit for at least six
years if the mail rates were based on the old book value;" therefore, the
merger may not have been possible unless the present exception had been
made.12  In recent years the CAB has been following a program of
encouraging mergers between certain air carriers. Postwar overexpansion
left many of the smaller carriers in a precarious financial condition; 13
mergers will strengthen some of these air lines by improving route patterns
and eliminating duplicated facilities. This program of encouraging mer-
gers, however, conflicts with the Board's policy of preventing mergers from
resulting in a write-up in the value of assets. Few mergers will be ac-
complished unless the new owners can expect to secure a mail rate which
will yield a fair return on the amount actually paid for equipment acquired.
The conflict cannot be resolved by arguing that the CAB should limit the
price paid for assets to the amount which has been utilized as a rate base
because the Board has power neither to force an airline to dispose of assets
nor to force disposal at less than market value.14  Previously it has not
disapproved purchase prices which were reasonable when judged by the
standards of the market.15
Experience of the early public utility commissions lends some sup-
port to the theory upon which the Board's original no write-up policy was
based. Affiliated utility companies frequently traded or sold property,
recording the book value at a higher level each time and thereby increasing
investment bases by which rates were determined. 16  To prevent this abuse
regulatory commissions have established uniform accounting systems which
require that all property be listed at the " . . original cost incurred by
11. Instant case at 2.
12. See West Coast-Empire Merger Case, C.A.B. Order No. E-6550 (June 27,
1952) at 6. The Board states that ". . . there is nothing in the West Coast-Empire
Merger decision indicating an intention by the Board to provide the air transporta-
tion industry with an incentive for mergers." Instant case at 4. However, the Post
Office Department and Chairman Ryan obviously do not concur in this conclusion.
The Board's statement probably is the result of language in Summerfield v. CAB,
207 F.2d 200, 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 74 Sup. Ct. 49 (1953), referred to by
the Postmaster in his objections to the rate proposed by West Coast. The court
there stated that the Act does not authorize the CAB to provide any incentives to
merger by means of manipulation of the mail rates.
13. The industry as a whole sustained a net operating loss of almost $21,000,000
in 1947. Koontz, Economic and Managerial Factors Underlying Subsidy Needs of
Domestic Trunk Line Air Carriers, 18 J. AIR L. 127 (1951). Total airmail pay-
ments to domestic trunk line carriers increased from approximately $27,000,000 to.
$37,000,000 between 1946 and 1948. The 1948 figure represented approximately-
$21,000,000 of subsidy whereas $9,000,000 of the 1946 sum is attributable to subsidy.
In 1948 "feeder" airlines received over $9,500,000 in air mail payments, 96% of which
was subsidy. Goodrick, Air Mail Subsidy of Commercial Aviation, 16 J. AiR L. 253,
259 (1949).
14. See Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 523, 529 (1947).
15. See United Air Lines, Inc.-Western Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Air Car-
rier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947); United Air Lines Transportation Corp., 4
C.A.B. 409, 413 (1943); Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940)
(supplemental opinion).
16. See TROXEL, EcowomicS OF PuBnc UTmirns 123 (1947).
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the person who first devoted the property to utility service." 17 Inflationary
increases in the market value of the property and its cost of replacement
are generally disregarded.' 8 When a sale takes place, however, many com-
missions will include excess of purchase price over original book value in
the new rate base " except when it appears that there has been a fictitious
or artificial increase in the sale price.20 Commissions generally agree that
a price determined in an arm's length transaction between independent
parties, as in the instant case, is a reliable measure of investment base and
will permit independent purchasers, by various accounting procedures, to
recover their entire cost from the consumers.21 A strict adherence to the
no write-up theory previously endorsed by the Board can result in delaying
economically sound and desirable acquisitions of property.2 This delay
may, by weakening the air lines, continue the necessity for federal subsidy
payments. The Board in the instant case seems to have struck a balance
between its diametrically opposed policies of encouraging merger and dis-
couraging fictitious write-ups of assets by giving West Coast depreciation
expense on full market value diminished by the amount of depreciation
already allowed to Empire.
17. TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 124. Any excesses of purchase price over
book value are recorded in special adjustment accounts and excluded from the rate
base of the affiliated purchaser. Id. at 125.
18. TROXE., op. cit. supra note 16, at 118.
19. Some commissions allow the price established in such a sale to become the
new rate base for the purchaser. Re The M.ontana Power Co., 56 P.U.R. (N.s.) 193,
208 (1944) ; Re Arkansas Power & Light Co., 55 P.U.R. (N.s.) 129, 157, 165 (1944).
Others, including the FPC, put any excess of purchase price over original cost in
separate accounts (excluded from the rate base) but permit it to be depreciated,
amortized, or otherwise disposed of. Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 46 P.U.R. (N.s.)
131, 140 (1942); Re St. Croix Falls Minnesota Improvement Co., 43 P.U.R. (Nq.s.) 1,
11 (1942).
20. Re New York Telephone Co., 52 P.U.R. (N.s.) 101, 111 (1943); Re Indiana
Hydro-Electric Power Co., 51 P.U.R. (N.s.) 55, 60 (1943).
21. See cases cited note 19 supra.
22. Professor Troxel reaches this conclusion regarding the "first cost" theory
of valuation utilized by some utility commissions. TRoxEL, op. cit. supra note 16,
at 303 (1944).
